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Today, after a long silence, the Nordic States are again investigat-
ing the idea of establishing a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The
renewed exchange of views is no doubt partly related to the continuing
development of nuclear weapons and partly to the fear that even in
circumstances where nuclear weapons would not be used against the
Nordic States they present a threat to the region should major war
break out. This fear was mentioned by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, the Presi-
dent of the Republic of Finland, in an address he delivered at the
Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm on May 8,
1978. He referred in this context especially to mini-nukes, precision-
guided munitions, neutron bombs and cruise missiles. The use of such
weapons cannot leave Northern Europe immune.
The Nordic States currently do not possess any nuclear weapons,
and as parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty there is no like-
lihood that the Nordic States will even consider obtaining these weap-
ons. While Denmark, Norway and Sweden have chosen this policy
voluntarily, in the case of Finland Article 17 of the Paris Peace Treaty
of 1947 includes a provision that "Finland shall not possess, construct
or experiment with any atomic weapon."
While the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone was not discussed dur-
ing the early 1970s, it was the subject of a lengthy exchange of views
among the Nordic Governments during the 1960s. This exchange of
views arose out of a more general discussion of nuclear-weapon-free
zones in the late 1950s.'
Indeed, the origin of the proposals to establish a Nordic nuclear-
weapon-free zone can be found in the proposals to establish a nuclear-
weapon-free zone in Central Europe. In 1956, the Soviet Union pro-
posed the creation of a wide zone in Central Europe where armaments
would be limited and under inspection. The zone was to have con-
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sisted of the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal
Republic together with some neighboring states.2 These States were to
agree that no military units equipped with nuclear weapons would be
maintained within the zone in question. The proposal was discussed
for quite some time by the Disarmament Sub-Committee of the United
Nations, but it was not accepted.
During the Twelfth Session of the General Assembly of the United
Nations the Polish Foreign Minister, Rapacki, presented a plan which
became known by his name. According to this plan Poland agreed to
accept under a condition of reciprocity with the German Democratic
Republic and the German Federal Republic a prohibition on the pro-
duction and stockpiling of nuclear weapons on its territory. Later, the
proposal was amended to include the territories of Czechoslovakia, the
German Democratic Republic, and the German Federal Republic in
addition to the territory of Poland. The proposal was by then more
detailed, and included a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons
against this zone by the nuclear powers. 3 In addition France, the So-
viet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States were to agree
not to maintain nuclear armaments for their military forces stationed
on the territories concerned.4 The prohibition extended to installa-
tions designed for serving nuclear weapons, including launching equip-
ment for the missiles. No nuclear weapons were to be delivered by the
above mentioned four permanent members of the Security Council of
the United Nations to the governments or other organs of the States
belonging to the zone. Member States of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
and Non-aligned States were to monitor the zone using observers and
a ground and air control network with inspection posts. The Rapacki
Plan would have been implemented by means of unilateral declara-
tions of the States concerned without any formal treaty arrangement.
The leading Western Powers felt that the Rapacki plan did not
deal with some other political problems, including the reunification of
Germany and limitations of conventional forces. They concluded that
the implementation of this plan would probably favor more member
States of the Warsaw Pact than member States of NATO. These argu-
ments led Rapacki to suggest that the existing nuclear position should
be frozen in the zone during the first stage.' During the second stage
2. I/II PROBLEME DER INTERNATIONALEN ABROSTUNG 508-09 (1964).
3. The Polish Memorandum has been published in DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS 195-99 (P. Zinner ed. 1958).
4. Id. at 200.
5. Broms, The Establishment of a Nuclear-Free Zone in Northern Europe, 1975 SCANDINA-
VIAN STUDIES IN LAW 44-45.
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the problem of the reduction of conventional armaments would be
linked with the implementation of the denuclearization.
As this amendment did not change the negative attitudes of the
Western Powers, the Government of Poland suggested at the Eighteen
Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1962 that the zone in
question be opened to any European State. Again nuclear weapons
would first be frozen, after which there would be stages during which
the denuclearization would be implemented. As the reception of the
new proposal was again negative, the Gomulka plan was put forward
by Poland on February 29, 1964. This plan's goal was now more lim-
ited, although the zone would have remained the same. Nuclear
weapons and thermonuclear charges would be frozen at their existing
levels and a control system would be established by the two major
military alliances with control points. Even this proposal failed to find
acceptance.
Although the above-mentioned Polish proposals did not succeed,
they were of distinct importance as the predecessors to several plans
which were later made concerning the establishment of a comparable
Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The first concrete proposal was
made by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Osten Und6n, in the First
Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on October
26, 1961. Und6n pointed out that various nuclear-weapon-free zones
could be envisioned and that their establishment deserved general sup-
port. He suggested that the basic principles of the Rapacki plan
should be extended to cover wider areas on a universal basis. Further
nuclear weapons tests were to be prohibited, as was any future dissem-
ination of nuclear weapons to countries which did not already possess
them. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was to prepare a
study on the willingness of those States which were not in possession
of nuclear weapons to give up future manufacture and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons on their territories. 6
The reception of the Und6n plan was divided. The leading West-
ern Powers were of the opinion that the plan could not be considered
without including in the discussions the problem of a general and com-
plete disarmament under international observation. As compared
with this attitude the Soviet Union together with several Socialist
States and Non-aligned States adopted a favorable attitude. Surpris-
ingly enough, the Government of Sweden sent a reply which was very
reserved and which mainly stressed the need to prohibit nuclear
6. The General Assembly adopted the resolution including the Und6n plan by 58 votes to 10,
with 23 abstentions. The co-sponsors of the resolution were Austria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethio-
pia, Libya, Sudan, Sweden and Tunisia.
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weapon tests by means of a treaty before the end of 1963. 7 This atti-
tude was sufficient to lead to the failure of the Undin plan. 8
II. THE FIRST INITIATIVE BY PRESIDENT KEKKONEN
The Und6n plan was, however, mentioned by President Kekkonen
in a speech which he delivered in May, 1963.9 He stressed that the
arms race was again accelerating and that the small States should,
therefore, take initiatives to relieve the existing international tension.
In his opinion the security of Finland was closely connected with the
security of the Nordic countries in general. While Denmark and Nor-
way were members of NATO, Finland and Sweden followed a policy
of neutrality. None of the four States had either obtained nuclear
weapons or wanted other States to stockpile such weapons on their
territories. Thus, there was already a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
existence. As this zone was based solely upon unilateral commitments
of the States concerned, there was a need to confirm the unilateral
undertakings by declaring the Nordic region a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in order to stabilize the positions of all Nordic States. Thus, the
region would be likely to remain free from speculation caused by the
development of nuclear strategy. It would also be a means to ensure
that the Nordic States would remain outside international tension.
This is, in fact, the gist of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-
free zone covering the Nordic States. It is expected to strengthen the
security of the Nordic States which do not have any individual wishes
to obtain nuclear arms.
The Nordic States are not in similar positions insofar as the possi-
bility of obtaining nuclear arms is concerned. It has already been
mentioned that, under the Paris Peace Treaty, Finland is not allowed
to possess any nuclear weapons. Sweden has no such limitations, but
Sweden has'consistently declared that nuclear weapons will not be ac-
quired. Denmark and Norway are NATO member States. Neverthe-
less, up until the present day both Denmark and Norway have clearly
indicated that they do not allow any stockpiling of nuclear weapons on
their respective territories. However, in case of a military clash be-
tween the leading military alliances it would be possible that Denmark
and Norway would be requested to change their policies and allow
7. The Swedish reply pointed out that unless a European Zone was established before the end
of 1963, the Government of Sweden reserved its right to reconsider the situation in the light of
the then existing circumstances.
8. When the Disarmament Commission began its work in May 1962, the problem of nuclear-
weapon-free zones was not taken up and the Und~n plan was not developed any further.
9. For the text of the speech, see FINNISH MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NORDIC Nu-
CLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE 84-85 (1988).
[Vol. 10:345
Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
nuclear weapons to be transferred to their respective territories. This
would doubtless put the nuclear safety of the Nordic region into jeop-
ardy. How could the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
then change the situation?
The answer lies in the nature of the zone to be established. The
nuclear Powers must guarantee not to use nuclear weapons under any
circumstances against the States forming the nuclear-weapon-free
zone. This is the essential quid pro quo for the relinquishment of nu-
clear weapons by the States joining the zone. Without such a guaran-
tee there would be no real advantage in the establishment of the zone.
On October 15, 1974, during an official visit to Finland, President
Podgorny declared that the Soviet Union was willing to give such a
guarantee to the States forming a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone.10
Podgorny went on to state that the other nuclear Powers would be
expected to join the giving of the guarantee. The guarantee would also
further the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Western nu-
clear Powers have so far not made any comparable statements.
Naturally, both Denmark and Norway are weighing their position
in light of the wishes and reactions of their allies in NATO. They
have the choice of relying on the NATO nuclear umbrella rather than
becoming members of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. Since the
presentation of the first proposal by President Kekkonen, the reactions
of the leading statesmen and Governments in Denmark and Norway
have been negative. They have explained that in order to be accepta-
ble the proposal to establish this zone should include a quid pro quo
for the loss of the NATO nuclear umbrella. As a possible quidpro quo
the Danish and Norwegian leading statesmen have often mentioned
the inclusion of the Kola Peninsula in the nuclear-free-zone. They
claim that the Kola Peninsula is so heavily armed with nuclear weap-
ons that only the inclusion of this region could be considered as a
sufficient counterweight.II
Denmark and Norway chose this condition carefully, quite proba-
bly because they felt that the Soviet Union would certainly not even
consider its acceptance. Their calculation proved to be accurate. The
Soviets responded negatively, explaining that no nuclear Power could
even consider a proposal to include a part of its territory in a nuclear-
weapon-free zone. This seemed to bring the matter to an end. There
followed a long period during which the proposal to establish the Nor-
10. Broms, supra note 5, at 51.
11. See, e.g., PROTOCOLS OF THE NORDIC COUNCIL 1362-63 (1964) (statements of Norwe-
gian Prime Minister Gerhardsen and Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Torsten Nilsson).
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dic zone was not seriously debated, although it still appeared at times,
especially in the pronouncements of the leading Finnish statesmen.
III. THE SECOND INITIATIVE BY PRESIDENT KEKKONEN
On May 8, 1978 President Kekkonen made a statement about the
proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free Nordic zone in a speech at
a meeting of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stock-
holm. 12 Referring to his proposal of 1963, President Kekkonen went
on to say that there had recently been a rapid development of nuclear
weapons and that, as a result of this, the possibility of a global nuclear
war had become much more real than before. It was, in the opinion of
President Kekkonen, especially dangerous to think that a nuclear war,
if ever there would be one, would remain a limited nuclear war. In his
opinion this would be very unlikely and under such circumstances the
Nordic States could hardly expect to be saved from the effects of a
nuclear war - even if they would not be parties to such a war. A
special warning was made with reference to cruise missiles.
As to the danger of cruise missiles, one needs only to take a look at
the globe. It becomes immediately clear that in a war involving the
leading Powers of the two major military alliances, cruise missiles
would probably be passing over the territory of the Nordic States as
the fastest route to the Northern regions of the Soviet Union and from
the Leningrad and Kola regions to comparable goals in the opposing
alliance. This fact illustrates the seriousness of the military situation
in the Nordic region even if the Nordic States themselves would not
have any interests in becoming parties to a military conflict. It should
be remembered that under international law a neutral State is under
an obligation to defend its territory during a state of war between
other States; yet there would be great risks involved if the Nordic
States were to take action against cruise missiles flying in their air
space. There would also be a great risk that the States party to the
military conflict would try to protect their own territories from nu-
clear attacks by pushing their air defence as far as possible outside
their territories proper in an effort to counter the nuclear weapons and
missiles before they enter their air space. During such attacks,
counter attacks, and defensive tactics, the position of the Nordic States
would become very vulnerable indeed.
Considerations like these led President Kekkonen to suggest that
the Nordic countries take action to negotiate on arms control both
among themselves and with the leading military Powers. The objec-
12. For the text of the address, see FINNISH MINISTRY, supra note 9, at 91-98.
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tive would be a treaty arrangement which would give a sufficient guar-
antee of the safety of the Nordic States. Having said this President
Kekkonen reached the conclusion that the proposal to establish a Nor-
dic nuclear-weapon-free zone had not lost its immediacy and that the
time would be ripe to give it serious consideration again.
In 1963 President Kekkonen had not done more than bring for-
ward his idea in general terms.1 3 Then, in 1978, President Kekkonen
listed certain elements which he regarded as necessary for the reaching
of an agreement. The first element was the realization that the secur-
ity concerns of all States in the area, as interpreted by the governments
concerned, must be fully taken into account. The second element was
that the leading Powers, whose strategic posture or military interests
might be affected in any way by the proposed zone, should be entitled
to participate in the negotiations from the very beginning. The third
element was that the States forming the nuclear-weapon-free zone
would have to receive an assurance from the nuclear Powers that they
would not use nuclear weapons against the territories of the States
forming the zone under any circumstances. This assurance would
have to include a promise to refrain from any air defense activity over
the Nordic States and from directing any missiles over the Nordic air-
space. To this it was added that the initiative for the negotiations con-
cerning the establishment of the proposed zone would have to come
from the States in the area of the zone and that they shall carry out the
negotiations in good faith, without coercion and pressure.
The reactions of the Scandinavian States were again very reserved.
It was argued that the proposal was too one-sided. These doubts were
based on the belief that a quid pro quo by the Soviet Union would still
be needed. The Governments of Denmark and Norway let it be un-
derstood that there was no need for further consultations until the So-
viet Union was prepared to let parts of its territory, especially the Kola
Peninsula, become part of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. This precon-
dition still seemed to be quite safe because of the often repeated Soviet
view that a nuclear power could never be expected to agree to the
extending of a nuclear-weapon-free zone to its own territory.
IV. NORDIC PROPOSALS
As a result of the doubts expressed by the Scandinavian States, the
Government of Finland did not suggest any consultations between the
Nordic States. On November 11, 1978 the Swedish Minister for For-
eign Affairs, Hans Blix, addressed the establishment of the nuclear-
13. Broms, supra note 5, at 47.
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weapon-free zone in a speech. He made a novel proposal suggesting
the necessity of including the Baltic Sea in the Nordic zone. This was
a condition which the Soviet Union was not willing to accept, how-
ever, because the Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea includes nuclear
submarines.
The debate in Norway took a new turn on October 3, 1980 when
Ambassador Jens Evensen of Norway made a statement in favor of the
establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. He was prepared to
accept a solution along the lines proposed by President Kekkonen in
1978. His statement came as a surprise. The Norwegian Government
immediately presented objections. A lengthy debate followed and it
was not until 1981 that a compromise was reached. According to the
compromise, the idea of establishing a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone was to be seen in a wider perspective. The Government of Nor-
way felt that the zone should cover parts of Central Europe in addition
to the Nordic States. The Norwegian Government still believed that
there was a need for a certain symmetry and felt that the Soviet Union
ought to allow the Kola Peninsula, or at least parts of it, to be in-
cluded in the zone. It was still generally believed that such a condition
was unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
At this stage, however, President Leonid Brezhnev took an unprec-
edented step forward. When interviewed by the Finnish daily newspa-
per Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, he explained that the Soviet Union
was now prepared to consider the inclusion of parts of the Kola Penin-
sula in the proposed Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. This an-
nouncement was greeted in Finland as a major change of policy and as
a most important contribution to the Scandinavian debate. President
Brezhn*ev also stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to guarantee
the safety of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone even if it would be
the sole guarantor State. He added, however, that a joint guarantee
given by the Soviet Union together with NATO Powers would be
preferable.
Strange as it may seem, the Governments of the Scandinavian
States took a very cautious attitude. The Governments of Denmark
and Norway now stressed the importance of seeing the establishment
of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone in a wider European perspec-
tive and not as limited solely to the Northern parts of Europe. As no
Nordic government initiated any official negotiations, the situation re-
mained the same as before.
Soon the progress of the disarmament talks within the framework
of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation and the
SALT negotiations slowed down. The debate on the Nordic nuclear-
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weapon-free zone continued, especially in Sweden, towards the end of
1982. The Government of Sweden proposed in January, 1983 that if a
nuclear-weapon-free zone were established it should extend south
from Scandinavia along the border between the Western and Socialist
States, as a 150 kilometre-wide zone on both sides of the border.' 4
The spokesmen for the Soviet Union did accept the main ideas of
the Swedish proposal. However, they believed that the proposed nu-
clear-weapon-free zone should be made wider. In the Soviets' opinion,
the zone should be 250 to 300 kilometres wide on both sides of the
frontier separating the two military blocs. The Government of Fin-
land also adopted a positive attitude to the Swedish proposal, ac-
cepting it in principle. The Governments of Denmark and Norway
have adopted a more cautious attitude, although they have expressed
their satisfaction with the idea of extending the nuclear-weapon-free
zone south from Denmark. This idea complies with the previous com-
ments of these two Governments when they stressed the importance of
seeing the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in a wider
European perspective.
Since the presentation of the Swedish proposal, the Danish situa-
tion appears to be such that the majority of the Parliament is at times
of different opinion than the Government on the issue of establishing
the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. In the recent past, this majority
has passed several resolutions asking the Danish Government to un-
dertake further studies of the zone issue. To clarify the situation, Dan-
ish Minister for Foreign Affairs Elleman-Jensen outlined the official
position of Denmark in November, 1985 as follows.' 5 He pointed out
that Denmark together with the other Nordic States already forms a
nuclear-weapon-free zone and that no Nordic State wants to change
this existing situation. Insofar as the establishment of a Nordic nu-
clear-weapon-free zone by means of an official treaty was concerned,
Denmark felt that its membership in NATO would have to be given
very careful consideration. The defence strategy of Denmark is based
on its membership in NATO, but the establishment of the nuclear-
weapon-free zone would mean that Denmark must give up the NATO
nuclear umbrella. The Danish Government did not wish to break off
solidarity with the other NATO member States. The same conclusion
had already been reached by the Dyvig Committee of the Danish legis-
14. The Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme explained the Swedish position in a speech de-
livered in Helsinki on June 1, 1983. See 4 UD INFORMERAR 13 (1984). On the views presented
in Sweden, see 0. BRING, NEDRUSTNINGENS FOLKRATr 169-71 (1987).
15. See DANISH FOREIGN OFFICE, No. 31, SPJaRSMALET OM EN KJERNEVAPENFRI SONE I
NORDEN 63-64 (1985).
Spring 1989]
Michigan Journal of International Law
lature in 1984. The Dyvig Committee had pointed out that an isolated
Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone would alter the premises of the Dan-
ish defence. It would also mean that the other members of NATO
could no longer plan their military strategy in reliance on the solidar-
ity of Denmark in defence. Furthermore, in the Dyvig Committee's
opinion, the creation of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone could
not guarantee that nuclear weapons would not be used against
Denmark.
Later the Danish Folketing (Parliament) did establish an Ad Hoc
Committee on Security Affairs. The Ad Hoc Committee has made an
effort to find a consensus among the members of the Folketing con-
cerning the policy choice for the defence of Denmark. However, views
are still quite divided, especially as far as the establishment of the Nor-
dic nuclear-weapon-free zone is concerned.
In 1982, the Government of Norway submitted a report (No. 101)
to the Storting (Parliament) on the basic issues of the security policy to
be followed.16 In this report the Government said that if Norway de-
cided to join a Nordic nuclear-weapon free zone it would mean that
Norway would give up its nuclear option not just in peace, but also
during war. This solution was said to differ considerably from the
present Norwegian policy of defence which supports the idea that nu-
clear weapons will not be transferred to the territory of Norway but
which, nevertheless, leaves Norway the option to decide otherwise in
case of necessity. The change of policy remains fully open to Norway
because the present situation is based solely on self-imposed
restrictions.
Insofar as the security guarantees are concerned, the Norwegian
report includes a statement to the effect that the negative security
guarantees suggested by the Soviet Union would interfere with the
Norwegian defence policy. Therefore, the position of Norway could
and should not be changed unless in connection with wider consulta-
tions with European States. Also, it would be most important to dis-
cuss the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone fully
with the NATO member States.
The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament pre-
pared a report in May, 1984.17 This report followed mainly the same
ideas which had been presented by the Government report of 1982.
As a result of the discussion in the Parliament, the Norwegian Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs decided in 1984 to set up the so-called Colding
16. See also, Innst. S. nr. 225 (1983-1984).
17. FINNISH MINISTRY, supra note 9, at 56-58.
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Committee to study the issue of establishing a Nordic nuclear-weapon-
free zone. The report of the Colding Committee was published in No-
vember, 1985.
The Colding report starts from the premise that the establishment
of the nuclear-weapon-free zone does not necessarily lead to incompat-
ibility with the membership of Norway in NATO. The zone could,
however, be regarded as a departure from the defence strategy of
NATO. Therefore, the joining of the zone could only be implemented
as a result of consultations within NATO and with the participation of
the nuclear weapon States.
The report included the idea that the zone should be wider than
the one which would cover only Nordic States. Following the earlier
policy of Norway, the report pointed out that the zone should cover
also those regions in neighboring countries where nuclear weapons are
stationed, including especially the Kola Peninsula. The Baltic region
was also mentioned in this context. In addition to the geographical
extension of the zone the report insisted that conventional armaments
be included in the discussions, and that in this context the Soviet
Union would have to reduce its conventional forces on the Kola Pe-
ninsula and in the Baltic region. In addition, conventional armaments
would have to be reduced in the German Democratic Republic and
Poland, as well.
The report also refers to the verification problem. In this context
the Soviet Union would have to agree to a verification system similar
to the one applied to the other States forming the zone. As to the
follow-up to the report, the Colding Report suggests that the questions
be taken up at the biannual meetings of the Nordic Foreign Ministers
as well as in other high-level meetings between the representatives of
the Nordic States.
The participation of Iceland in the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone did not belong to the original version proposed by President Kek-
konen. Later he let it be understood that, should Iceland be interested
in joining the zone, it would be welcome to participate in the negotia-
tions. In March, 1985 the Icelandic Minister for Foreign Affairs Hall-
grimsson submitted to the Lathing (Parliament) a report on the
Government policy in this matter.18 This report adopted a negative
attitude, as it was explained that the establishment of the zone would
not enhance the security of Iceland. Doubts were also expressed as to
whether the zone would even enhance the security of the other Nordic
States.
18. Id. at 54-55.
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The establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone was
discussed later in 1985 in Iceland's Parliament, which decided to
adopt a resolution on this idea in May, 1985. This resolution did not
include any definite stand on the problem, but suggested rather that
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament should investigate
the matter in order to find out whether the participation of Iceland in
such a zone would be advisable. In April, 1986 the new Minister for
Foreign Affairs Matthiesen stressed the need to investigate the balance
of conventional armaments in the same context as the establishment of
the zone. In his opinion the matter should be taken up in the first
place among the members of NATO. He saw, however, no reason
why Iceland could not participate in the Nordic consultations, too.19
While the views concerning the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-
weapon-free zone thus differ among the Nordic States, it should be
noted that no Nordic State has adopted a firm negative stand against
the establishment of the zone. On the whole, one might draw the con-
clusion that Finland has always been most favorable to the idea, and
that the Swedish Government has adopted a somewhat less enthusias-
tic attitude but has tried to present different alternative solutions to
the problem in actual practice.
The views of Denmark and Norway, as well as of Iceland, have
always been very reserved. This is indicated by the various precondi-
tions proposed by Denmark and Norway ever since the idea was first
presented. This is understandable when one takes into account the
fact that Denmark, Norway and Iceland have to consider their duties
as members of NATO. One might even say that while Finland and
Sweden - should they join the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone -
do not stand to lose anything, the position of the member States of
NATO is different. They risk losing the membership in this military
alliance if NATO decides that member States are not allowed to give
up the nuclear weapon option. This situation could only change if the
leading members of NATO agree to the establishment of the nuclear-
weapon-free zone, and especially if they agree to give negative guaran-
tees to all those States which form the zone.
What, then, are the views of the leading NATO member States? A
general reservation as to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free
zones in Europe is characteristic of the military strategies of France,
the United Kingdom and the United States. 20 As far as the Nordic
19. This had been suggested by Prime Minister Olof Palme in his speech, supra note 14.
20. On October 21, 1974, Senator Symington explained in the First Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations that the United States was interested in the establishment of
nuclear-free zones provided the following four conditions were fulfilled: (1) the initiative must
[Vol. 10:345
Nordic Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
nuclear-weapon-free zone is concerned, the Governments of these
three States have expressed their doubts as to the necessity of such a
zone. The zone is relatively narrow and is located where the NATO
and Warsaw Pact States are geographically very close to one another.
Given these circumstances, the three Governments feel that the zone
does not give any added guarantee to the States forming the zone. In
addition, from the point of view of NATO, the Nordic zone would not
be any reinforcement of the current strategic position. In fact, it has
been argued, especially by the Government of the United States, that
the Nordic zone would be more advantageous for the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact States because they would all know that no nu-
clear weapons could be stored within the territories of the NATO
member States which join the zone. A conventional attack against the
States forming the zone could not be resisted with nuclear weapons.
Although the French Government has strong doubts as to the ad-
visability of the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone,
President Mitterrand has admitted that he personally can well under-
stand those Governments which support the idea in the belief that it
would give an added feeling of security to their populations. The Gov-
ernments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have
been unanimous in saying that they will not attack with nuclear weap-
ons any State which does not possess nuclear arms or which belongs to
a nuclear-weapon-free zone assuming that such a State is not attacking
their own State or is not an ally to another State which opens up an
armed conflict against one of the nuclear member States of NATO.
In the light of these comments by the Governments of the leading
member States of NATO, it is evident that the Governments are look-
ing at the situation from their own strategic perspective. Apparently
these Governments acknowledge that the Soviet Union has a stronger
conventional arms position in Northern Europe and that, therefore,
the nuclear option from Denmark, Iceland and Norway is an impor-
tant counterweight. It is also apparently regarded as an important
part of the NATO military strategy.
As to the opinions of the Soviet Union, one may conclude that the
basic attitude of the Soviet Union has not changed. This can easily be
seen from the concessions the Soviet Union apparently would be pre-
pared to make in allowing parts of the Soviet territory to become parts
of the zone to be established. 21 As to the People's Republic of China,
come from States situated in the region concerned; (2) all important States of the region must be
included in the nuclear-free zone; (3) the necessary security arrangements should not be dis-
turbed; and (4) a satisfactory system of verification must be arranged.
21. Thus, President Chernenko confirmed in 1985 that the Soviet Union is ready to commit
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it has not taken any stand as to the idea of the establishment of a
Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. It has, however, explained that it
would not use nuclear weapons against any State which does not pos-
sess these weapons or which belongs to a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Thinking in terms of the common strategies adopted in the dis-
armament negotiations, one might even reach the conclusion that the
positive attitude of the Soviet Union in this particular case is to a great
extent responsible for the negative attitude adopted by NATO member
States. This is not so surprising because it is a well-known truth that
whatever one party proposes in disarmament negotiations is usually
suspected of being solely in favor of the party concerned. 22 Therefore,
many well-meant proposals have in the past been rejected in the gen-
eral disarmament negotiations. It is to be hoped that this will not be
the case concerning the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. The idea
should, at least, be fully discussed between all the parties concerned
and the decision to be reached should be based on the consideration of
all relevant factors.
V. LEGAL PROBLEMS
The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone naturally in-
volves legal problems. The first one is normally the choice of the legal
method to adopt when the zone is being created. As far as the Nordic
zone is concerned there are two major alternatives: a multilateral con-
vention or unilateral declarations. Many factors favor the choice of
the first mentioned alternative. Some of these factors are purely prac-
tical, but the convention method would be the result of negotiations
between the States concerned, or as a result of an international confer-
ence between such States. In both cases the States participating in the
negotiations would be in a position to express their views as to the
specific questions arising, and any problems could be solved as a result
of direct multilateral negotiations which would be more practical than
other methods - including unilateral declarations.
As it is impossible to think of the establishment of the Nordic nu-
clear-weapon-free zone without negative guarantees, such guarantees
- or at least the terms concerning the undertaking to give guarantees
- should be included in the convention creating the zone. The guar-
itself not to use nuclear weapons against such Nordic States as become parties to the nuclear-
weapon-free zone. The assurance can either be given in a multilateral treaty or in a bilateral
treaty with each zonal State. The same promise was given by Mikhail Gorbachev in a speech
delivered in Murmansk on October 1, 1987. He went on to say that the States concerned will
have to decide whether the guarantees be given in the form of multilateral or bilateral treaties,
unilateral declarations, or in some other way.
22. See Broms, supra note 5, at 54-55.
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antees should expressly state that the guarantor States agree not to use
nuclear weapons against any State party to the zone under any cir-
cumstances. In case parts of the Soviet territory would be included in
the zone, the guarantee would have to be formulated taking this into
account. The same is true, of course, of the alternative solution
whereby the Nordic zone would extend south from Denmark.
Although the verification problem has been raised as a supposedly
difficult problem, due to recent developments in the disarmament ne-
gotiations the problem of verification is no longer as complicated as it
was a few years ago when on-site inspections still caused great difficul-
ties between the leading military Powers. It will be necessary, how-
ever, to decide whether the verification is to be implemented through
the States parties to the multilateral convention to be drafted, or
whether it would be advisable to involve an international organization
like the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this respect, the
Treaty of Tlatelolco offers in this respect a model solution of how the
International Atomic Energy Agency is being used as a controlling
organ.23 Because of the geographical proximity of the Headquarters
of this organization, its services could be recommended.
In addition to the more general legal problems, there are many
specific questions to be answered. For example, one might refer to the
possibility of including the Baltic Sea in the Nordic nuclear-weapon-
free zone. Here the question arises concerning the legal status of the
high seas. As far as the right to innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea of the States forming the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone is
concerned, the solutions will have to be carefully considered, taking
into account the rules of customary international law and the provi-
sions included in the new Convention on the Law of the Sea. In this
context a special issue concerning the passage of nuclear-weapon mili-
tary vessels or military vessels carrying nuclear material in the Baltic
Sea or some parts thereof will also have to be solved.24
If the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone were extended to cover
territories under Danish administration, notably the Faeroese Islands
23. The system of control is founded on a treaty drafted by the signatories in conjunction
with the International Atomic Energy Agency. The signatories are expected to give information
in the form of reports to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and to the International Atomic Energy Agency. On the authorization of Council of the Agency,
the Secretary General of the Agency is entitled to ask for special reports in case of need. The
Council of the Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been empowered to
make special investigations.
24. See Article 23 of the Law of the Sea Convention. U.S. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Oct. 7, 1982, Art. 7, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 62/122. On the problem of passage through the
straights to and from the Baltic Sea, see B. JOHNSON-THEUTENBERG, FOLKRATT OCH
SAkKERHETSPOLITIK 226-28, 233-35 (1986).
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and Greenland, this would have to be taken into account in the draft-
ing of the multilateral convention. This is also the case for the Jan
Mayen Island.
Further problems to be solved include provisions concerning the
entry into force of the convention. Apparently the convention will
have to be ratified by all States concerned before it enters into force.
Similarly, consideration has to be given to the problem of whether to
allow a State which has ratified the convention to denounce it due to
unforeseen events. In this respect the Treaty of Tlatelolco deserves to
be looked into closely. 25 In so far as the time during which the con-
vention would be in force is concerned, it seems to be appropriate not
to limit it. This solution is based mainly on the nature of the under-
taking of the parties to the convention. To choose a relatively short
renewable term of validity would not seem to create the necessary con-
fidence in the entire undertaking. It would be likely to lead to very
strong doubts, at least among the present member States of NATO,
because they would be giving up their nuclear umbrella when entering
into the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone. To agree to do so and be
faced with the possibility of only a temporary arrangement would
probably not be acceptable.
These are only examples of the legal issues to be addressed in the
drafting of the convention to establish the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone. There are certainly other difficulties depending on the number
of the parties and of the extent of the zone and, in particular, depend-
ing on the extension of the zone to cover territories at a long distance
from the Scandinavian State. There one has to remember that the par-
ties to the convention cannot regulate the legal status of the maritime
territories and the high seas outside the territorial waters or their ex-
tensions in the form of fishing and exclusive economic zones and the
continental shelves concerned.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Although the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone has been debated at length both within the Nordic States and
outside their circle among the Great Powers, no final conclusions have
been made so far. As has been mentioned, following a lengthy period
of silence the Nordic States have, during the last few years, again ex-
pressed an increased interest in this basic idea.
25. See also Garcia-Robles, The Latin-American Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, in THE ARMS




The most recent exchange of views indicates that the Foreign Of-
fices of the Nordic States have included the zone idea among those
which are being constantly surveyed. Because it is generally under-
stood, however, that the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-
free zone cannot be seen as an isolated phenomenon, but must be ac-
cepted as a part of wide disarmament perspectives and negotiations,
the Nordic States have adopted a "wait and see" attitude. No Nordic
State is, for the time being, trying to influence the views of the other
States concerned. The future developments will most certainly depend
on the Great Power relationships in general. A possible lessening of
international tension would seem to be the decisive factor at this stage,
in view of continued negotiations between the States concerned.
It is hoped that the nuclear weapon Powers would try to better
understand that for the Nordic States - due to their geographical
position between the two major military alliances, and to the member-
ship of some in NATO - the problem of nuclear security is of a differ-
ent type than for those States which have chosen the nuclear weapon
alternative for their defence. The Nordic States have not chosen this
alternative and are, therefore, seriously concerned with their security
in the event of a military conflict between the major military alliances.
In addition, it must be underlined that at least the official Government
view in Finland has been that regional military tension would diminish
as a result of the establishment of the Nordic nuclear-weapon-free
zone.26 It is hoped that the nuclear-weapon Powers will, by and by,
believe this, too.
26. President Mauno Koivisto said in a statement on the twentieth anniversary of the propo-
sal for a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone, May 28, 1983, that the guiding thought of President
Kekkonen had lost none of its validity. On the contrary, it has gained more importance recently.
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